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For a long time, the central focus of anthropology
has been on the study of the so-called traditional
societies. However, with the transformation of
those societies into "ethnicized" groups within state
systems, anthropologists have had to rethink their
concepts, theories, and methods. They have had
to deal with, among others things, issues of cul
tural difference, cultural boundaries, and cultural
movements. This article looks retrospectively at
certain changes that have taken place in anthro
pology especially with regard to the study of eth
nicity.
Anthropology has not generally been considered, by out
siders or by itself, as concerned centrally with ethnicity. As
Evans-Pritchard, one of the deans of early anthropology, wrote:
"While social anthropologists consider that their subject
embraces all human cultures and societies, including our own,
1

Ethnic Studies Review Volume 21

they have...for the most part given their attention to those of
primitive peoples."i But, with the realization that there are no
"primitive" peoples and with the transformation of supposedly
isolated "traditional" societies into minorities within state sys
tems, the discipline has not only found itself confronted with
"ethnicized" groups but has been compelled to rethink its con
cepts, theories, and methods in ways which are significant and
instructive for ethnic studies.
This opportunity to look retrospectively at anthropology
traces the course of ethnographic and theoretical encounters
with what would come to be called "ethnicity." The major con
tributors to an "anthropology of ethnicity" are presented, even
though they often did not see themselves as engaged in such
an effort. Rather, as the field grappled with cultural difference,
cultural boundaries, and cultural movements, it found itself
inhabiting an "ethnic" landscape. As the qualities-and even
the contents-of those cultures changed, anthropology neces
sarily reflected back upon its own concepts and theories and
engaged in a significant re-thinking, especially in regards to
what exactly a "society" is, what its relation to "culture" is, and
how we should represent it ethnographically. These issues
should be and have been important for ethnic studies and
speak to the convergence of the social sciences in this crucial
domain.
Romantic Nationalism and "Culture Circles"
Before there were scholars of ethnicity or nationalism,
there were ethnic and national phenomena, or better yet, eth
nic or nationalist activists; then, as today, "the significance of
the ethnic factor in many societies has been forced upon us
more by events than by research." One of the first and most
influential scholar-activists of what we could call "ethnic con
sciousness" today is the German nationalist philosopher
Johann Herder (1744-1803). Herder believed that the agent
of human history is not the species as a whole nor the individ
ual but an intermediate level, the national group or nationality.
This is because each national group, he argued, is an "organ
ic unit," a "national organism" with its own unique and natural
qualities and genius, its own special culture and language, its
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own national soul. Herder used such phrases as Nationalgeist,
Seele des Vo/ks, Geist der Nation, and Geist des Vo/ks to cap
ture this national peculiarity which was, to him, "inexpressible."
Being that the "natural and the national were synonomous in
Herder's mind" ii he perceived it as the ineffable yet rightful unit
of mankind: "Every nationality is one people, having its own
national culture as well as its language." iii
Being a natural unit, "the group becomes a single
being, an individuality, a personality," in which culture is the
national personality, the group mind. The bearers of this cul
ture, and even more so the authors or creators of this culture,
the "individual prophets, writers, artists or poets are but the
means employed by the national soul to give expression to a
national religion, a national language, or a national literature."iv
Being natural and distinct, national culture and the nation
should be cultivated, unfettered by artificial rules and undis
turbed by other foreign influences; to do otherwise would be to
upset nature's plan and to interfere with the natural processes
of human development.
The relationship between early anthropology and the
German philosophers like Herder (and Hegel and others) and
ethnologists is a critical one for defining the concepts and the
interests of the new field. German notions of Kultur and espe
cially Kulturkreis are central in importance. Kultur, as Culture
with a capital "c," is seen as one great world phenomenon,
unfolding, developing, progressing in Hegelian fashion. In this
way, all of the particular cultures of the world can be placed on
the continuum of Culture. The German ethnologist Graebner
and others interested in cultural history and evolution used the
term Kulturkreis or "Culture circle" to refer to clusters of cultur
al traits which existed at various places at various times and
distinguished societies. The original culture circles were the
goal of this study, and all of the world's cultures were to be
classified in terms of their relation-their proximity or distance,
geographically, temporally, and culturally-to the fundamental
circles. The distribution of cultural traits thus became a central
preoccupation of ethnology, along with the history of their diffu
sion. E. B. Tylor states that the geographical distribution and
the diffusion of cultural traits must be studied in the same man
ner in which the botanist and the zoologist study plant and ani3
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mal species and their diffusion. It might even be argued that
ethnology began as a kind of naturalist science, each "culture"
or "society" viewed as a "species" distinguishable by a list of
characteristics.
The Critique of Race and Nationalism
In a way, Franz Boas, perhaps the first professional
modern anthropologist, both followed previous intellectual
trends and set new ones. Furthermore, especially for our pur
poses, he saw anthropology as a vital contributor to important
issues of the day such as racism and nationalism. He suc
cessfully and repeatedly deconstructed race as a concept,
arguing that a race is not an objective or demonstrable descent
group; there is as much physical variation within a race as
between races; there are no "clear-cut geographical and bio
logical lines between the races;"v and there is no correlation
between race on the one hand and either mental or cultural
characteristics on the other.
In his sociocultural analyses, Boas asserted that every
"tribe" or "primitive society" is a closed society; even so, he rec
ognized that primitive societies are not actually socially and
culturally isolated, that even "the simplest groups" have been
affected and changed by contact with each other. Every cul
ture, then, is, in his view, constructed as much by external fac
tors and influences as by internal ones. He also understood
that, while social and racial phenomena are two discrete levels
of reality and analysis, the two may overlap-"social divisions
[may] follow racial lines"vi - and when they do the racial dif
ferences may be important for creating, preserving, and exac
erbating social differences and inter-group conflict.
Boas also writes about nationalism in an instructive
way. For example, he distinguishes between nation and
nationality, using "nation" basically the way we would use
"state" today and "nationality" basically as we would use
"nation"; a nationality for him is "a group of people alike in
speech, culture, and in most cases representing no fundamen
tal racial contrasts."vii Yet, although nationalities are usually
racially homogeneous, he granted "only the slightest relation"
between nationality and race; in fact, he found most racial
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antipathies "fictitious" and actually derived from other sources
than race, and in the final analysis he found both terms
"vague." He saw no necessary equation between nations and
nationalities. A nationality may inhabit two or more nations (he
gives Italy before unification as an example), or two or more
nationalities may inhabit the same nation (he gave
Czechoslovakia and Poland as examples).
What exactly constitutes a nation, then? This is prob
lematic: objective characteristics like descent or unity of lan
guage are not sufficient to make a solidary, identity-sharing
group. Instead, it is something more subjective, more psycho
logical or emotional-"the community of emotional life that aris
es from our everyday habits, ... thoughts, feelings, and
actions."viii Where that community feeling is lacking, even indi
viduals who share descent and language may not share iden
tity and may actually be in conflict. But where nation-bound
aries and nationality-boundaries are not co-terminous, social
frictions may arise, eventually taking the form of nationalist
movements.
Boas, interestingly, distinguished between two kinds of
nationalism: the nationalism of nations and the nationalism of
nationalities. Predictably, the nationalism of nations (what we
might call "patriotism" today) attempts to unify the people of the
nation regardless of the differences of constituent nationalities;
it is integrative at the "state" or civil level. The nationalism of
nationalities (modern "nationalism") strives to unify the people
of the nationality regardless of nation (political) boundaries and
is, therefore, disintegrative of actually-existing political organi
zation and either separatist or "alternatively integrative" in the
sense of positing a new political organization. Boas essential
ly applauded the efforts of nations and nationalities to integrate
at a higher level, expressing "full sympathy" with their desire to
dismantle "the artificial barriers of small political units."ix.
However, he does not approve of nationalism in the sense of
separatism and particularism, that is, of creating smaller and
less inclusive social groupings. For him, inclusiveness, ever
higher levels of social integration, ultimately a "federation of
nations," is not only desirable but inevitable. He sees such an
inexorable march toward integration in history (notwithstanding
moments of revolution and devolution) that he is absolutely
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confident that this direction "will govern our history in the
future" until its ultimate "consummation." x
The Ethnography of a Changing Africa
It was considered by early professional anthropologists
"to be an advantage to be able to study those societies which
are structurally so simple, and culturally so homogeneous, that
they can be directly observed as wholes, before attempting to
study complex civilized societies where this is not possible."xi
Thus, for theoretical and political (i.e. colonialism) reasons,
much of early anthropology's (especially British social anthro
pology's) attention was turned to Africa. However, even "func
tionalists" like Malinowski questioned this homogeneity and
readily admitted the realities of cultural diversity, contact, and
change. Often enough, what anthropology has to study is not
the "'uncontaminated' Native" nor the "well-defined, circum
scribed entity" called "a society" or "a culture" of anthropologi
cal (and popular) imagination but a tumultuous social land
scape in which each member and each society is part of a
large, interconnected, constantly-changing whole which
includes not only neighboring "natives" but Western societies
and their agents and institutions as well. Therefore, even fifty
years ago or more, he could maintain that "the scientific anthro
pologist must be the anthropologist of the changing Native.
Why? Because what exists nowadays is not a primitive culture
in isolation but one in contact and process of change."xii
Malinowski referred to nationalism as one of the "new
and unexpected forces and factors" on the contemporary cul
tural scene. But two opinions are manifest in his investigation
of non-Western (largely African) nationalism: that this national
ism is not a purely "native" phenomenon" and that it is not a
purely "traditional" phenomenon. First, he perceived the role of
Western culture, particularly but not exclusively in the form of
colonialism and colonial administration, in the evolution or
development of native nationalism. In cultural change, whether
nationalism or some other type, there are generally "two cul
tures to deal with instead of one." New cultural phenomena and
movements are a product of both cultural sources, but they are
not a simple combination of the two old sources; rather, they
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are "entirely new products" born of the impact and hybridization
of the two cultures, and the resultant phenomena have "no
antecedents in Europe or in African tribalism." The nature,
quality, and direction of a development such as native nation
alism "is determined by factors and circumstances which can
not be assessed by the study of either culture alone.... The
clash and interplay of the two cultures produce new things."xiii
Thus, nationalism, or we might add ethnicity, is certain
ly not a simple continuation of traditional culture into the mod
ern political world. It is rather an emergent and original social
phenomenon in itself. Even if it takes the form of revivalism or
irredentism or millenialism or what have you-even if it refers
to or invokes tradition or culture or history-it is not "tradition"
but some new treatment of and perspective on tradition. Such
nationalism or ethnicity is precisely "retrospective" in the sense
that it is not tradition but a memory of or a look back at a cul
ture and custom which once was-or maybe never was. The
former "tribalism" and the contemporary "nationalism" are any
thing but identical for Malinowski: tribalism is un-self-con
scious, while the new nationalism is sophisticated and self-con
scious, reaching for "elements of the old culture... with a sec
ondary, almost ethnographic interest in racial history, custom
ary law, and the artistic and intellectual achievements of their
race."xiv The old tribalism is already dead, and what is afoot at
present is not a memory but an invention.
Accordingly, the objective establishment by anthropo
logical means of the "true culture" or the "true past" of a socie
ty is in the end less important, not only in itself but for under
standing contemporary activities, than the study of what is
going on presently and how that culture and past is being
employed and deployed in the present. In true functionalist
fashion, he argued that what anthropologists are often eager
to collect (that is, what the "old men of the tribe" have to tell us
about the past, the "authentic culture," etc.) is less than useless
as science, as scientific investigation of the past, since it is
memory, "affected by sentiment, by retrospective regrets, and
longings." However, in a particularly insightful moment,
Malinowski suggested that this is not only all right but impor
tant-important for understanding not the past but the
present-since for the modern anthropologist studying cultural
7
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change, "what really matters is not the objectively true past,
scientifically reconstructed and all-important to the antiquarian,
but the psychological reality of today." xv Therefore, he allows
us to see that native nationalism, even in its early manifesta
tions, is not "traditional culture at work" but "traditional culture
remembered," and that the "retrospective vision" upon which it
is based is subjective and, ultimately, creative.
Fortes and Evans-Pritchard provide an analysis of sev
eral specific "traditional" African societies and find that they are
neither so traditional nor always "societies" in the strictest
sense. They describe, for example, that supposedly homoge
neous African societies actually exhibit a striking amount of
heterogeneity. In the introduction, they state that groups such
as the Zulu, Ngwato, Bemba, Banyankole, and Kede "appear
to be an amalgam of different peoples, each aware of its
unique origin and history, and all except the Zulu and Bamba
are still to-day [sic] culturally heterogeneous." xvi The contribu
tions which make up the book support this general contention,
adding that the groups themselves and the territories they
occupy are often fairly recent developments. The Zulu, for one,
were only constituted as a "nation" when the defeated peoples
of the great leader Shaka were organized into a single political
cultural complex; within the "nation" "old tribal loyalties and
oppositions are still at work and faction fights frequently
occur." xvii Schapera describes how the Ngwato "tribe" is a con
geries of people, with about 20% actually belonging to the
"nuclear community" of Ngwato (and even they were aggregat
ed only in the eighteenth century after a schism from the
Kwena group) and the rest coming from diverse populations
"who became subject to the Ngwato chiefs at various times
through conquest in war, voluntary submission, flight from an
invading enemy, or secession from some other tribe." xviii
Richards reports that many of the "traditional societies" of
Africa have occupied their territory for less than two hundred
years and many for as little as fifty to one hundred.
Finally, Gluckman argues that not only is diversity with
in "traditional societies" ordinary and tolerable but that conflict
is also ordinary and may even be integrative. Societies, even
small traditional societies, are "always elaborately divided... by
customary allegiances" which cross-cut and sometimes con-
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tradict and come into conflict with each other. The central point
of his book is to show "how men quarrel in terms of certain of
their customary allegiances, but are restrained from violence
through other conflicting allegiances which are also enjoined
on them by custom. "xix Thus, it becomes possible to think of
societies as internally diverse and segmented while still inte
grated; at the same time, it becomes clear that societies may
not be as integrated as ethnic or national ideology and action
stipulate or require. Finally, the crucial lesson for us in regard
to modern ethnicity and ethnic conflict, as Gluckman's analy
sis shows, lies in the cross-cutting allegiances which "tend to
inhibit the development of open quarrelling" and worse in the
totalizing, and thus segregating, ideology. In contemporary
ethnicity, some or all of these cross-cutting and therefore uni
fying institutions or customs are lost or denied. The totalization
of "culture" and of the claims based on culture let slip the
restraints which bind groups in civil, if hostile, relations and cre
ate conditions for uninhibited and total confrontation and con
flict.
Plural Societies and Fluid Boundaries
The great early ethnographers tended to represent tra
ditional societies as discrete units in general isolation from
other groups and from outside influences, especially Western
influence (even when, as we have seen, their own commentary
contradicted this image). Two works in the 1 950s began to
challenge that view, both theoretically and ethnographically.
One of these is Furnivall's Colonial Policy and Practice xx which
is noteworthy for its acknowledgment of the i nextricable link
between traditional-societies-as-found and colonial and other
outside factors and for the elaboration of the concept of "plural
society." The book offers two consequential insights: that colo
nial societies (particularly Burma and N etherlands India or
Java) are heterogeneous and that nationalism in the two soci
eties is a result of colonialism. Burma, for example, is not one
society but many; Burmese (or Burmans, as a "national" or
"ethnic" category) are one of numerous peoples (which he calls
"races") in the territory including Shan, Mon, Karen, Kachin,
etc. "Burmese society" as a modern social system also con9
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tains other important groups, the exclusion of which from
analysis would illicitly simplify or even falsify the picture. These
other groups include Indians, Chinese, and of course
Europeans. Not only was this society heterogeneous, but it
was also "enclaved," with Indians, Chinese, Europeans, and
"Burmese" all filling different "niches" in the social system (with
the Chinese and Indians monopolizing t.he "middleman" posi
tions of finance and trade between Europeans and the gener
al population). These groups formed what we would only call
today "ethnic groups" and differed considerably in their inter
ests. These differences resulted in communal violence in 1 924
and 1 93 1 .
In Burma he sees nationalism at its earliest in the area
of religion, on the part of Buddhist monks who organized reli
gious revivalist movements and institutions such as the Young
Men's Buddhist Association. N ationalism at this stage took the
form of interest in the past culture of Burma-or one of the
past cultures of Burma. By 1 92 1 , though, he reports that
nationalism had passed from religious to political expression,
and the new General Council of Buddhist Associations set its
goal as home rule or even complete separation from England.
The divergent interests of the constituent communities, cou
pled with the low mobilization of the masses, made concerted
action difficult. There was, in effect, no "Burmese nation" from
which a movement could arise and for which it could speak.
The consequences of self-government have been profound.
As a first step, a Burma Government was established under
the British Parliament in 1 937 but showed a number of weak
nesses. For one thing, the legislature had authority only over
Burmese people and not others in areas traditionally and
administratively associated with Burma, such as Karenni, the
Kachin H ills, or the Shan states. For another, the legislative
seats were allotted on two different principles, territory and
community. Just under a third of the seats (40 out of 1 32) in
the House of Representatives were reserved for communal or
other special interests, 37 of those 40 for Karens, Indians,
Chinese, and naturally Europeans. Thus, representative gov
ernment actually did not help integrate the society but rather
set the stage for the activation, aggravation, and escalation of
"sectional friction"(487). Placing groups in a position to com10
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pete for political power as groups threatened to elevate cultur
al and economic differences into political and "nationalistic"
level.
The other element in Furnivall's analysis, and by far the
more enduring one, is his concept of the plural society.
Politically, a plural society "comprises separate racial sections"
(or again, we might prefer "ethnic" over "racial," although in the
case of Burma the differences are more than just cultural).
There is a mix of different groups, each with its own culture,
language, religion, etc., but more crucial than their co-presence
is their social segregation: "they mix but do not combine"(304).
They live side-by-side as citizens of the same polity but do not
form a society in any significant way; they constitute a sort of
caste system without the religious integration of the real thing.
This is why Furnivall rejects the characterization of the U. S.
and Canada as plural societies: they have "plural features"
(that is, a diversity of cultures and races sharing political and
economic space), but they also have at least some measure or
ideology of integration and equality.
An even more influential early ethnography for the pur
pose of elucidating ethnicity and the relation between ethnic
groups and culture also took place in Burma. Leach's Political
Systems of Highland Burma xxi was the first serious and suc
cessful challenge to the standard approach of anthropology
toward "society" and "social boundaries" up to that time.
Encountering an extremely diverse and tangled cultural situa
tion in the area of fieldwork, the Kachin Hills Area, he found that
it was impossible to maintain simple and consistent distinctions
or boundaries between the "social groups."
The two main social categories in the region are Shan
and Kachin. Shan are Buddhist, wet-rice cultivators, and
organized into hierarchical "castes" with a hereditary nobility.
Kachin, on the other hand, are an assortment of "hill peoples"
with significant differences in language, territory, and politics
from each other. Thus, here began Leach's problem. First,
there was no systematic relation between the linguistic, the ter
ritorial, and the political aspects of Kachin groups; it was diffi
cult to determine where one group ends and the next begins,
or even whether they are "different groups" at all. Second,
transfer of population, individually and collectively, is possible
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between Kachin and Shan categories; Shan society has been
assimilating Kachins for at least a century (and probably much
longer), such that "nearly all low class Shans are probably
either of slave or commoner Kachin origin"(222) . And the over
all oscillation between political structures which he found with
in Kachin societies was also a result of association with and
imitation of Shan politics: Kachin chiefs took Shan princes as
their role-models and attempt to emulate their powers and pre
rogatives.
From these observations Leach asked the question
which naturally occurs to us today but which he was perhaps
the first one to perceive: When can we say that two groups are
"two different societies" or merely "two segments of the same
society"? The failure to tackle or even recognize this problem
anthropologically up to this point, he argues, is in the very
anthropological concepts of "society" and "culture"; in such
complex and enmeshed social contexts as highlands Burma,
"ordinary ethnographic conventions. . . are hopelessly inappro
priate"(28 1 ). In fact, he maintains that the differentiation of
Shan and Kachin as distinct "societies" was an invention of
British colonial administration in Burma, which imported
Western notions of discrete social units and even more so of
race. The entire population was classified for administrative
purposes by race-race, he finds, "being a synonym for lan
guage.. .. The Kachins were deemed to be a 'race' therefore
they must possess a special language"{43) . Further, the British
tried to draw clear territorial boundaries between the "Shan"
and "Kachin" "societies." Where language/dialect and territory
coincided, especially if some order of kinship relation could be
established for the "enclosed" group, a "tribe" was inferred.
Leach's answer to this situation is to reconceive the
units of analysis in anthropology and the reasons for cultural
variation. "Tribe" is, at least in many cases, an "academic fic
tion": "the ethnographer has often only managed to discern the
existence of 'a tribe' because he took it as axiomatic that this
kind of cultural entity must exist" (29 1 ) . Rather, he suggests a
unit of analysis appropriate to the ethnographic context, which
in the present case would be the entire Kachin Hills Area with
its many cultures, languages, and named collectivities. Such
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collectivities would not be considered "social isolates" but ele
ments in a larger and more inclusive social system. Second,
the collectivities which comprise the system, and indeed the
system itself, should be seen to have no stability through time:
individuals flow from one political system to another; entire vil
lages or groups undergo structural transformation from one
political system to another, and the very form of the over-arch
ing system may change as time proceeds. The traditional
anthropological notion of equilibrium in society is rejected by
Leach.
Thus, in the end, Leach concludes that cultural cate
gories and cultural identities are not really objective, tangible
things but subjective, symbolic things; the identity or bound
ary of a social collectivity "is not necessarily ascertainable in
the realm of empirical facts; it is a question, in part at any
rate, of the attitudes and ideas of particular individuals at a
particular time"(288). In reconceiving "culture" and "society"
as so open, fluid, even invented, the relationship between the
two becomes for us analysts and ethnographers much more
problematic, various, and unique to each case.

Primordialism: Natural Bonds to Cultural Givens
Within a decade, Old Societies and New States,xx ii
appeared and shaped subsequent discourse, not only within
anthropology but within ethnic studies. A number of authors
contributed to this volume, but by far the most influential chap
ter is the one written by Geertz himself, "The Integrative
Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New
States." The book grows out of and adds to the increasing
awareness among anthropologists of the cultural conse
quences and problems of the "new states" formed as a result
of decolonization; while this topic is compelling enough in itself,
it also has implications for the typical "objects" of the discipline,
the "traditional," small-scale social isolate called a "society" or
"culture." With the new "nation-building," the so-called "integra
tive revolution," these social units are no longer isolated and
self-contained but become part of larger, more inclusive social
13
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systems. Anthropology's method and concepts would have to
adjust accordingly as the objects of study themselves or per
haps even disappear.
Geertz, following Edward Shils, sees the problem of the
new states as stemming from the "primordial" diversity of the
enclosed societies within the states, which resists or at least
complicates the creation of a state-wide society or "civil order."
In a word, "the new states are abnormally susceptible to seri
ous disaffection based on primordial attachments"(259). He
goes on to explain his notion of "primordial" and "primordial
attachment" in one of the most oft-quoted passages in all of
anthropology or ethnic studies:
By primordial attachment is meant one that stems from
the "givens"-or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably
involved in such matters, the assumed "givens"-of social exis
tence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly but
beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a
particular religious community, speaking a particular language,
or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social
practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so
on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering,
coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's
kinsmen, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, ipso facto, as
the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity,
common interest, or incurred obligation but at least in great
part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed
to the very tie itself (259-60).
The political problem, as he sees it, is that this primor
dial particularism-"tribalism, parochialism, communalism,
and so on"-threatens civil order and state integration in a
more aggressive and insatiable way than other forms of
social identity or discontent. "Economic or class or intellectu
al d isaffection threatens revolution," but primordial disaffection
threatens the boundaries if not the very existence of the state;
it rejects outright the whole idea and fact of the state and its
disembodied civil order outright. For this reason primordial
sentiments have "a more ominous and deeply threatening
quality than most of the other... problems the new states
face"(26 1 ).
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Circumstantialism: Ethnic Boundaries, Not Ethnic
Contents
There were always those in anthropology and else
where, like the Marxists, who rejected the primordial argument
and favored a constructionist or "circumstantialist" approach.
The seminal book within anthropology for this position was
Ethnic Groups and Boundariesxxiii by Barth and his contribu
tors. Like Leach before them, they find that cultural variation
and social/ethnic boundaries are not co-terminous: groups with
qualitative cultural differences are often subsumed under the
same social/ethnic label and identity by outsiders or even by
members, while groups with no major cultural differences are
often distinguished into two or more social/ethnic categories.
Consequently, "although ethnic categories take cultural differ
ences into account, we can assume no simple one-to-one cor
respondence between ethnic units and cultural similarities and
differences"(1 4). Failing to find any sure understanding of eth
nicity through a description of the content of a culture, Barth
directs our attention instead to the relations between groups
and the ways culture is used to generate and preserve those
relations.
The two central notions of this approach are ethnic
boundary and social interaction. Ethnic groups are categories
or categorial distinctions, socially bounded groups as deter
mined by the social conditions in which two or more groups live
and interact (even if that interaction takes the form of no inter
action, as in total communal segregation). Ethnic groups are
thus understood "as a form of social organization," a particular
species of social categorization which "classifies a person in
terms of his basic, most general identity, presumptively deter
mined by his origin and background"(1 3). One of the curious
and problematic things which he and his colleagues, and many
other anthropologists, have noticed, though, is that social iden
tity is not entirely ascribed, that people can in fact change their
identity and their social/ethnic affiliation in many cases
(although not always or in any way). In the book under discus
sion, fur farmers in Africa, for example, can become Baggara
pastoralists. What is interesting to Barth and the rest is that,
although personnel may flow from one category or group to
15
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another, the boundaries of the categories or groups persist. In
fact, in this view, the continuity of ethnic groups depends nei
ther on biological nor cultural continuity; individuals may come
and go, and cultural traits may come and go. On the contrary,
the "continuity of ethnic groups . . . depends on the maintenance
of a boundary. The cultural features that signal the boundary
may change, and the cultural characteristics of the members
may likewise be transformed; indeed; even the organizational
form of the group may change, yet the fact of continuing
dichotomization between member and outsiders" can remain
(1 4). Simply stated, it is "the ethnic boundary that defines the
group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses"(1 5) .
The ethnic-boundary approach allows-or forces-us
to consider how ethnic distinctions emerge. Barth proposes
that there is no obvious or a priori way in which ethnic groups
are formed or in which culture is deployed in the formation;
indeed, only circumstances will determine which cultural traits
"are used...as signals and emblems of difference," which "are
ignored," and which "are played down or denied"(p. 1 4) . Any
number of elements-"tribe, caste, language group, region or
state," to which we might add religion, history, race, custom,
and others-are perfectly adequate and useful as ethnic "dia
critica." Additional consequences to mention in this diminution
of the role of cultural difference in ethnic identities would be
that the loss of difference between groups, assimilation in the
purest sense, would not necessarily lead to a reduction in the
personal salience or the "organizational relevance" of ethnic
identity and that a great knowledge of culture, in particular of
the history of culture-of culture in the past, of "tradition"
would not necessarily lead us to a greater knowledge or under
standing of the ethnic group.
Constructing Cu lture and Reth i n king Anthropology

Barth's and other studies emphasize creativity and adaptability
over tradition and the "survival" of primordial factors. In partic
ular, changes in the subject-matter of anthropological inquiry
(ostensibly, "primitive" or "traditional" societies) began to raise
epistemological concerns within anthropology itself. These
changes include the emergence of new social groups, "super16
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tribafization" or the formation of larger social units through
amalgamation or absorption of smaller ones, culture-based
(i.e. indigenous rights or irredentist) social movements, cultur
al revivals, etc., state-building processes and cultural resist
ance to these processes (including nationalist and separatist
movements and ethnic wars), "tribally" organized resistance to
development projects such as the Kayapo anti-dam activities in
Brazil, and the "nativization" or rejection of post-colonial
Western culture and/or the reclamation of (sometimes defunct)
traditional cultural features. We might also mention the entry
of "tribal peoples" into professional and political positions, with
advances in their education which gave them access to
anthropological writings. Altogether, these factors raised the
unavoidable issue of inter-society contact and extra-society
connections, rendering the concept of isolated and static soci
eties utterly obsolete. They helped precipitate an epistemo
logical crisis in anthropology: who exactly is the Other? How
can we describe them in ethnographic terms? How can our
methodologies cope with the interconnected complexity of the
emerging social order? In the end, is knowledge of other cul
tures possible, and if so, what responsibilities and guilts do we
bear as members (and representatives) of dominant, formerly
colonial societies?
Among the first to respond was Hymes, with three
issues of importance to ethnicity. The first of these revolves
around the concept of culture as "traditional" versus "emer
gent." If the objects of study are changing, then the study too
must change: anthropology should, Hymes states, redefine
itself from the study of primitive or small-scale societies to "the
study of the emergence of cultural forms in concrete settings
and in relation to a world society."xxi v The second issue con
cerns the role of anthropology in particular and of Western
society in general in the political, that is exploitative, relations
between "our" society and "the Others." William Willis , one of
the contributors, defines anthropology as, to a large extent,
"the social science that studies dominated colored peoples
and their ancestors-living outside the boundaries of modern
white society."xxv Therefore, anthropology has been anything
but a pure scientific endeavor; even the concepts and theories
of anthropology he sees as having political ramifications: ideas
17
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of primitive society, of isolated society, of functionalism, of
ethnographic voice at work to "absolve white people of their
crimes" against colored societies, to "facilitate the imperial pol
icy of divide and rule," and to "preclude the discovery of socio
cultural links wider than tribal allegiances." xxvi
The third issue from Hymes' book is the specifically
epistemological one-whether our ethnographic descriptions
are objective accounts of other cultures. Berreman quotes
Zaretsky's criticism of the positivist ethnographic tradition "that
the truth is there and that it is objectively discoverable, if only
we experts look hard enough; if only we find the right mod
els." xxvii Scholte takes a clear stand in asserting that anthro
pology "is never only scientific" and that, "as cultural products
and processes" themselves, anthropology's concepts, meth
ods, and "knowledge" are bounded by the culture and interests
of anthropologists, making anthropology itself an appropriate
object of investigation to anthropology.
Wagner takes this analysis one step further, consider
ing how anthropology actually invents culture, in two senses:
as the general idea of culture and as the particular individual
social units or cultures to be described. This invention consists
of the assumption and then the construction of "a concrete enti
ty, a 'thing' that has rules, 'works' in a certain way, and can be
learned" xxviii; that is, as the anthropologist tries to account for,
understand, and represent the behavior of others, he/she cre
ates a cultural "object' out of the data and experience.
Anthropology, in this interpretation, is "the study of man 'as if'
there were culture"(1 0). "The study of culture is in fact our cul
ture" ( 1 6). He even likens anthropology to a culture-cult.
Having allowed this kind of creativity to anthropologists,
he says, we cannot deny the same kind and import of creativi
ty to the culture itself and its members. He goes so far as to
suggest that invention is culture. The implication of this per
spective is that all people-anthropologists and natives, "mod
ern" or "traditional"-are creatively assembling and advancing
their behavior, the reasons for their behavior, and the circum
stances (or interpretations of circumstances) of their behavior
continuously, especially under conditions of social ambiguity or
novelty which provide a kind of culture shock; people control
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and make sense of their experience "through all kinds of imag
ined and constructed 'rules,' traditions, and facts" (35).
Since then others have continued to develop and build
upon these insights with important consequences both for
anthropology and for ethnicity studies. Hobsbawm and Ranger,
for instance, present data to show that many phenomena
which we call traditional are in actuality relatively new, that
behaviors or symbols "which appear or claim to be old are
often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented." xxix Such
"invented traditions" refer to the past and avow a continuity with
the past, but this continuity is "largely factitious," serving an
ideological function as "a legitimator of action and cement of
group cohesion." The invocation of the past, the establishment
of a link to the past, gives ethnic groups and nations what they
need most-an apparent continuity and naturalness or primor
diality. In fact, they assert, as others have, that "tradition" of
this sort is evidence of a distinct and decisive break with the
past, a new self-consciousness, reflexitivity, and problemati
cization of culture and identity which would be odd if not impos
sible in the "traditional" setting to which invented traditions
refer: after all, "when the old ways are alive, traditions need be
neither revived nor invented"(8).
Anderson goes even further to consider nations as
"imagined communities" in which the members "will never
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their com
munion."xxx The crucial features of this image of nation are its
boundedness, its sovereignty, and its community (that although
there are social differences and inequalities-vertical differ
ences-within the nation yet the nation shares a "deep, hori
zontal comradeship"). In particular, the development and diffu
sion of printing and vernacular print-languages created "unified
fields of exchange and communications" giving rise simultane
ously to a culture, an audience for that culture, and the mental
image of that audience as a community to its far-flung mem
bers. In print but not only in print, for also in other mass media
like radio and television, as well as in political activity (the for
mation of parties, the giving of speeches, the casting of votes,
etc.) and many other practical behaviors, a disparate group can
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come to recognize or believe in commonalities with each other,
whether or not those commonalities are old or even real.
Kuper picks up one thread of this argument to show
that a particular kind of culture, or a particular conception of
culture, is invented, that is, "primitive" culture. He demon
strates, through a consideration of the early history of anthro
pology, how the idea of primitive society was "a fantasy which
had been constructed by speculative lawyers in the late nine
teenth century" xxxi such as Bachofen, Maine, McLennan, and
Morgan (8). Indeed, the "idea of primitive society fed the com
mon belief that societies were based either on blood or on soil
and that these principles of descent and territoriality may be
equated with race and citizenship, the contrasting components
of every imperialism and every nationalism"(9). Yet, even as he
says this he perceives that anthropology is changing-perhaps
again, reinventing itself. "It is no longer about the primitive, and
no longer particularly or necessarily about 'the Other "' (243).
In fact, the object of anthropological inquiry is often
these days anthropology itself. This is most forcefully posited
in Clifford and Marcus. In Clifford's introduction, he asserts
that ethnography, the central activity of knowing and describing
culture in anthropology, "is always caught up in the invention,
not the representation, of culture." xxxii Our knowledge of other
cultures is not entirely scientific or "objective" becau_se it is par
tial and perspectival, constructed in the encounter between
anthropologist and member, and conditioned by all sorts of
anthropological customs and conventions. In fact, such knowl
edge could not be scientific or objective since cultures "are not
scientific 'objects' ... [but] are produced historically, and are
actively contested"( 1 8). In particular, the notion of anthropolog
ical literature is taken very seriously, alluding to all of the liter
ary devices and tropes that ethnographers employ to represent
the knowledge or experience they gain in the field and to pres
ent that knowledge and experience, from narrative voice to
scene-setting techniques to the d issolution of the investigator
into the "objective" account of the culture. Description is impli
cated with representation (choices about how to make the cul
ture-as-learned-by-the-ethnographer at once clear, convincing,
compelling, and relevant) as well as interpretation and, in the
end, invention by both researcher and informant; the informant
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"invents" answers to specific questions, and the researcher
"invents" a coherent monograph and therefore "culture" out of
the answers. Thus, Clifford identifies what he calls the "cultur
al poesis" which is located in the "specific exclusions, conven
tions, and discursive practices" of ethnography.
The consequences for ethnicity of the poetic and politi
cal invention of culture should be obvious. Fischer, explicitly
states that ethnicity, like all other facets of culture, "is some
thing reinvented and reinterpreted in each generation by each
individual," xxxiii even if it may seem natural, incomprehensible,
or individual him/herself. As an invention it can never be mere
or pure tradition but is a contemporary product of "a process of
inter-reference between two or more cultural traditions," partic
ularly the "ethnic" culture and the modern plural culture in
which it is currently situated and for which it is currently pre
pared. Therefore, as we have seen repeatedly, ethnicity may
evoke a past to which it is connected-and it may even actual
ly be connected to that past-but the real point of ethnicity,
Fischer writes, is to create new values, a new vision of mean
ing and "the good," "an ethic workable for the future."
Conclusion: The Message of Culture-and the Messenger
The anthropologist is a messenger, yet he or she is a
not mere and objective messenger: when one finds a message
(the "culture" or may even more so the "meaning" of the cul
ture) "he appropriates it, translates it, and makes it 'relevant' to
those to whom he delivers it."xxxiv In a certain sense, anthropol
ogy creates or styles its message and meaning out of its
encounter with particular people and social situations. The
anthropologist does not, in the end, merely discover a society
or culture nor "translate" cultural "texts" "the way the translator
does. He must first produce them"(43).
The implicatio.n for ethnicity in simply this: if, upon
reflection, we can identify and attribute these facets and forces
to the anthropological "version" of culture, we can hardly deny
them to the "native's" or "member's" version. In other words,
as members go about "doing" their culture they are also creat
ing their culture, out of the same "complex play of desire and
power" which is heightened and focused in the ethnographic
21

Ethnic Studies Review Volume 21

encounter. "Culture" and "history" exist as a kind of passive
and plastic data which individuals, groups, and proto-groups
and would-be groups can interpret, consciously or uncon
sciously, and even manipulate in the service of their desire and
power. Desire-to be a group, to be a superior group, to right
perceived wrongs, to establish a culture-based society or poli
ty, or what have you-can color the "facts" or "truths" of "cul
ture" so thoroughly that the desire becomes the truth; in a more
sinister manner, if an individual, party, or group desires to
achieve power or status by way of culture, by invoking culture
and calling upon others to heed the call, it is all too easily done.
In the process, the messenger takes on a second role as mes
sage-creator, although he or she may mystify this role by claim
ing merely to "find" or "discover" or "recognize" or "represent" a
true culture out there. At the same time, message receiver, the
"group-out-there," which may not have been waiting for a mes
sage, has its own desires, which may or may not coincide with
those of the messenger-or may be made to coincide.
In a sense, then, the ethnic leader or "ethnic entrepre
neur'' xxxv not only carries a cultural "truth" but invents one,
especially when the ethnic group is not fully "self-aware" or
"awake" until the leader and his truth appear. This is why we
so often find competing leaders with competing messages
about what the group is, which part of its culture or history is
most critical to its identity and future, and what it should do
next. Ethnic members, like anthropologists, are free to look for
their message, to let their desire lead them toward certain mes
sages, and to act upon the message which compels or serves
them; different members will necessarily find and convey dif
ferent messages from the same culture and history, and the
"ethnicity" which ultimately emerges can only be understood as
a consequence of "the complex play of desire and power"
between the competing versions and their competing carriers.
In conclusion, we have followed the development of the
concept of ethnicity and ethnic group in anthropological theory
and ethnography from that of a natural and primordial, almost
physical and spiritual, phenomenon to a problematic and vari
ably-bounded one to, ultimately, a constructed, political, poetic,
and future-oriented one. We have seen that this development
has been driven principally by changes in the phenomenon
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itself-the rise of new groups, the demise of old groups, the
shift of cultural foci of existing groups, and the emergence of
political significance for ethnicity. Anthropology, as the science
of culture, has helped problematize culture in a valuable way
for ethnic studies. Simply put, ethnicity is not identical to cul
ture or tradition, and ethnic groups are not necessarily distinct
cultural groups. It has become clear that we cannot get at eth
nicity merely by way of "cultural content," of a list of cultural
traits on which ethnic groups differ point by point. Groups in
any common social system will share some traits and vary on
others, and the ethnic lines do not always fall where the cultur
al lines do-and neither lines are permanent. In fact, an objec
tive list of cultural traits does not even exist in a certain sense
but is constructed, invented, in social interaction, whether this
interaction is the fieldwork encounter, the colonial encounter, or
the contemporary ethnic members' experience in his or her plu
ral society. While ethnicity and ethnic conflict are not mere or
pure cultural opportunism, and invention (of groups or even of
traits) is not completely without restraint, failure to recognize
the contextual, circumstantial, fictive, and political qualities of
ethnicity render it and its resultant manifestations much more
opaque, irrational, and absolute than they really are.
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